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    Designing a Reward-Penalty Scheme to Improve Technical Performance of Distribution System Employing Distributed Generation (DG) Resources

    , M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology Jooshaki, Mohammad (Author) ; Abbaspour Tehranifard, Ali (Supervisor) ; Fotuhi Firuzabad, Mahmud (Supervisor)
    Abstract
    Reward-penalty schemes are known as the most effective tools to regulate the service quality. This thesis tries to design a comprehensive reward-penalty scheme to properly motivate electricity distribution companies (DisCos) to improve the reliability and reduce the energy losses in their networks using Distributed Generation (DG) Resources. So, as the first step, the designing methods of reward-penalty scheme (RPS) and their advantage and disadvantages are introduced, and also a method based on concept of the Yaredestic theory is proposed. The proposed method uses the Fuzzy clustering and is able to set the parameters of RPS in a fair and efficient way. The proposed RPS is implemented on... 

    Impacts of Performance Based Regulation on Distribution Network Automations

    , M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology Modarresi, Mohammad Sadegh (Author) ; Fotuhi-Firuzabad, Mahmud (Supervisor)
    Abstract
    In spite of the fact that failures in distribution systems constitute a high percentage of customer’s interruptions, they have received less attention than generation and transmission systems at least in the amount of academic and industrial publications in the past decades. However as the business turns its attention to customers from consumers, focuses are moving toward power distribution systems in recent years. Its main problem that makes this high percentage of contribution in customer’s interruption is their widespread applications through all the places that there is a civilization. Contribution of many components in the system leads to high failure rate and because they spread every... 

    Optimal equilibrium selection of price-maker agents in performance-based regulation market

    , Article Journal of Modern Power Systems and Clean Energy ; Volume 10, Issue 1 , 2022 , Pages 204-212 ; 21965625 (ISSN) Rayati, M ; Sheikhi, A ; Ranjbar, A. M ; Sun, W ; Sharif University of Technology
    State Grid Electric Power Research Institute Nanjing Branch  2022
    Abstract
    This paper analyzes the oligopolistic equilibria of multiple price-maker agents in performance-based regulation (PBR) markets. In these markets, there are price-maker agents representing some frequency regulation (FR) providers and a number of independent price-taker FR providers. A model of equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPECs) is employed in this paper to study the equilibria of a PBR market in the presence of price-maker agents and price-taker FR providers. Due to the incorporation of the FR providers' dynamics, the proposed model is reformulated as a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem over innovative mathematical techniques. An optimal equilibrium point is... 

    Design of Incentive Scheme for Reliability Improvement in Electricity Distribution Networks

    , Ph.D. Dissertation Sharif University of Technology Mohammadnezhad Shourkaei, Hossein (Author) ; Fotuhi Firuzabad, Mahmoud (Supervisor)
    Abstract
    The regulation is necessary for the electric distribution networks as a natural monopoly. Regulators have been applied the Performance Based Regulation (PBR) for the control of price. The common model of PBR is price cap. Price cap creates sufficient incentive for cost efficiency. However, it decreases the service quality in distribution systems. The aim of this thesis is to design a comprehensive model for improvement of service reliability in the presence of PBR. An incentive model is developed using reward-penalty theory and yardstick theory. Reward-penalty theory is a financial approach that rewards the utility with good reliability and penalizes the utility with poor reliability. The... 

    Designing a new procedure for reward and penalty scheme in performance-based regulation of electricity distribution companies

    , Article International Transactions on Electrical Energy Systems ; Volume 28, Issue 11 , 2018 ; 20507038 (ISSN) Jooshaki, M ; Abbaspour, A ; Fotuhi Firuzabad, M ; Moeini Aghtaie, M ; Lehtonen, M ; Sharif University of Technology
    John Wiley and Sons Ltd  2018
    Abstract
    This paper introduces a new fuzzy-based design procedure for more efficient application of reward-penalty schemes in distribution sector. To achieve a fair as well as applicable regulation scheme, the fuzzy C-means clustering algorithm is employed to efficiently determine the similarity among distribution companies. As setting procedure of the reward-penalty scheme parameters can significantly affect the income of different companies, a new procedure based on the membership degrees obtained from the fuzzy C-means algorithm is proposed to fairly determine these parameters for each electricity distribution company. Some numerical studies are performed on the Iranian electricity distribution... 

    Impact of penalty-reward mechanism on the performance of electric distribution systems and regulator budget

    , Article IET Generation, Transmission and Distribution ; Vol. 4, issue. 7 , 2010 , p. 770-779 ; ISSN: 17518687 Mohammadnezhad-Shourkaei, H ; Fotuhi-Firuzabad, M ; Sharif University of Technology
    Abstract
    As a part of the ongoing debate about competition in the electricity industry, regulators are increasingly considering performance-based regulation (PBR) as an alternative to improve the service quality. The fundamental principle behind PBR is that good performance should lead to higher profits, and poor performance should result in lower profits. A penalty-reward structure (PRS) in a PBR mechanism can enhance utility performance to align utility interests with customer's interests. During the implementation of PBR, regulators should spend or receive money to reward good performed utilities or penalised poor performed utilities, respectively. A technique is proposed, in this study, to not... 

    A new reward-penalty mechanism for distribution companies based on concept of competition

    , Article IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe, 12 October 2014 through 15 October 2014 ; Volume 2015-January, Issue January , October , 2015 Jooshaki, M ; Abbaspour, A ; Fotuhi Firuzabad, M ; Moeini Aghtaie, M ; Ozdemir, A ; Sharif University of Technology
    IEEE Computer Society  2015
    Abstract
    In this paper, a new method for designing procedure of Reward-Penalty Scheme (RPS) in distribution system is proposed. Being fair and adoptable in viewpoint of distribution companies (DisCos) are main superiorities of the proposed RPS. Established based on concept of the Yardstick theory, its application can ensure regulators that a perfect competition will be created between DisCos to improve the service reliability. Also, such a regulation scheme can be a key for power system decision makers in order to prevent the DisCos from decreasing service reliability. Aimed to reach a fair mechanism, the proposed RPS rewards/penalizes the DisCos only compared with the other ones owning similar... 

    Impact of penalty-reward mechanism on the performance of electric distribution systems and regulator budget

    , Article IET Generation, Transmission and Distribution ; Volume 4, Issue 7 , 2010 , Pages 770-779 ; 17518687 (ISSN) Mohammadnezhad Shourkaei, H ; Fotuhi Firuzabad, M ; Sharif University of Technology
    2010
    Abstract
    As a part of the ongoing debate about competition in the electricity industry, regulators are increasingly considering performance-based regulation (PBR) as an alternative to improve the service quality. The fundamental principle behind PBR is that good performance should lead to higher profits, and poor performance should result in lower profits. A penalty-reward structure (PRS) in a PBR mechanism can enhance utility performance to align utility interests with customer's interests. During the implementation of PBR, regulators should spend or receive money to reward good performed utilities or penalised poor performed utilities, respectively. A technique is proposed, in this study, to not...