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The cooperative game theory foundations of network bargaining games
, Article Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), 6 July 2010 through 10 July 2010, Bordeaux ; Volume 6198 LNCS, Issue PART 1 , 2010 , Pages 67-78 ; 03029743 (ISSN) ; 3642141641 (ISBN) ; Hajiaghayi, M ; Immorlica, N ; Mahini, H ; Sharif University of Technology
2010
Abstract
We study bargaining games between suppliers and manufacturers in a network context. Agents wish to enter into contracts in order to generate surplus which then must be divided among the participants. Potential contracts and their surplus are represented by weighted edges in our bipartite network. Each agent in the market is additionally limited by a capacity representing the number of contracts which he or she may undertake. When all agents are limited to just one contract each, prior research applied natural generalizations of the Nash bargaining solution to the networked setting, defined the new solution concepts of stable and balanced, and characterized the resulting bargaining outcomes....