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    FMNV continuous non-malleable encoding scheme is more efficient than believed

    , Article 13th International ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, 7 September 2016 through 8 September 2016 ; 2016 , Pages 72-78 ; 9781509039494 (ISBN) Mortazavi, A. S ; Salmasizadeh, M ; Daneshgar, A ; Sharif University of Technology
    Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc 
    Abstract
    Non-malleable codes are kind of encoding schemes which are resilient to tampering attacks. The main idea behind the non-malleable coding is that the adversary can't be able to obtain any valuable information about the message. Non-malleable codes are used in tamper resilient cryptography and protecting memory against tampering attacks. Several kinds of definitions for the non-malleability exist in the literature. The Continuous non-malleability is aiming to protect messages against the adversary who issues polynomially many tampering queries. The first continuous non-malleable encoding scheme has been proposed by Faust et al. (FMNV) in 2014. In this paper, we propose a new method for proving... 

    Strong continuous non-malleable encoding schemes with tamper-detection

    , Article Information Sciences ; Volume 451-452 , 2018 , Pages 253-270 ; 00200255 (ISSN) Mortazavi, A. S ; Salmasizadeh, M ; Daneshgar, A ; Sharif University of Technology
    Elsevier Inc  2018
    Abstract
    A non-malleable encoding scheme is a keyless encoding scheme which is resilient to tampering attacks. Such a scheme is said to be continuously secure if the scheme is resilient to attacks containing more than one tampering procedure. Moreover, such a scheme is said to have the T-tamper-detection property if any kind of tampering attack by an adversary chosen from a predetermined class of algorithms T is detected. Faust et al. have introduced a continuous non-malleable encoding scheme based on non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) which is secure in a strong model for which the adversary receives the tampered codeword as a response to its tampering query if the tampered codeword is not...