An Analysis of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Health Insurance of Iran

Please enable javascript in your browser.

Zomorrodi Anbaji, Mahdieh | 2008

466 Viewed

Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 39114 (44)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Management and Economics
Advisor(s): Keshavarz Haddad, Gholamreza
Abstract:
This paper aims to estimate a model of demand for health insurance and medical care in Iran in the presence of the heterogeneous and latent health status of individual; moreover it tests the asymmetry of information in the health insurance industry of Iran. Our dataset consists of whole family budget survey of 2006. The parameters of model are estimated by G.M.M method then the presence of asymmetry information (adverse selection and moral hazard) is tested by a non-parametric method simultaneously. Our model is specified under minimal assumption about the selection process in to the different insurance categories and the statistical distribution of individual’s latent health status
Keywords:
Asymmetric Information ; Semiparametric Method ; Health Market Analysis

No TOC