A Game Theoretic Inventory Model for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Poisson Demand, M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology ; Hajji, Alireza (Supervisor)
Abstract
In this research, we study the differences between the centralized and decentralized approaches in a two-stage serial supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer under the lost sale policy. The centralized approach results in optimal solution of the system and the decentralized one is based on Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer is the leader. The retailer uses the continuous review (r, Q) policy and the demand arrives according to the stationary Poisson process. In order to obtain the solution for two approaches, a set of computational steps are developed. Furthermore, we provide a numerical example and the corresponding sensitivity analysis to compare the two approaches....
Cataloging briefA Game Theoretic Inventory Model for a Two-Echelon Supply Chain with Poisson Demand, M.Sc. Thesis Sharif University of Technology ; Hajji, Alireza (Supervisor)
Abstract
In this research, we study the differences between the centralized and decentralized approaches in a two-stage serial supply chain including a manufacturer and a retailer under the lost sale policy. The centralized approach results in optimal solution of the system and the decentralized one is based on Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer is the leader. The retailer uses the continuous review (r, Q) policy and the demand arrives according to the stationary Poisson process. In order to obtain the solution for two approaches, a set of computational steps are developed. Furthermore, we provide a numerical example and the corresponding sensitivity analysis to compare the two approaches....
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