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- Type of Document: Article
- DOI: 10.1109/ISCISC.2014.6994047
- Abstract:
- A great number of authentication protocols used in several applications such as payment systems are inherently vulnerable against relay attacks. Distance bounding protocols provide practical solutions against such attacks; some of which are lightweight and implementable on cheap RFID tags. In recent years, numerous lightweight distance bounding protocols have been proposed; however, a few of them appeared to be resistant against the existing attacks up to the present. One of most well-known protocols in this field is the SKI protocol which has a security proof based on a non-standard strong assumption named Circular Keying. In this paper, we demonstrate that without this strong and non-standard assumption, the protocol is not secure against man-in-the-middle attacks. Subsequently, we propose a countermeasure solution to secure the SKI protocol without the circular keying assumption
- Keywords:
- RFID ; Authentication ; Radio frequency identification (RFID) ; Security of data ; Authentication protocols ; Distance bounding ; Distance bounding protocols ; Mafia fraud ; Man in the middle attacks ; Practical solutions ; Relay attck ; Standard assumptions ; Network security
- Source: 2014 11th International ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ISCISC 2014 ; 2014 , pp. 199-203 ; ISBN: 9781479953837
- URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6994047