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Management and Efficient Allocation of Resources in Competitive Networks

Farhadi, Farzaneh | 2018

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  1. Type of Document: Ph.D. Dissertation
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 50794 (05)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Electrical Engineering
  6. Advisor(s): Golestani, Jamaloddin
  7. Abstract:
  8. In contrast to traditional Networks where a designer can specify an action plan for each agent, in a network with strategic agents, every agent acts selfishly and chooses his strategy privately so as to maximize his own objective. In this dissertation, we study problems arising in the design of static and dynamic networks with strategic agents. We consider two classes of design problems. In the first class, the designer utilizes her control over decisions and resources in the system to incentivize the agents via monetary incentive mechanisms to reveal their private information that is crucial for the efficient operation of the system. In this class of problems, we address two main challenges in designing monetary incentive mechanisms for static and dynamic networks. In static networks, we discuss the challenge of designing an efficient and dynamically stable monetary incentive mechanism for solving the joint flow control and multi-path routing problem. To address this challenge, we propose a monetary mechanism that in addition to the realization of optimality and dynamic stability, satisfies the features of budget balance and individual rationality. In dynamic networks with correlated information and interdependent valuations, we discuss the challenge of designing an efficient and risk-free monetary incentive mechanism for enhancing network security. To address this challenge, we propose a mechanism that relying on the inter-temporal correlation among the agents' information and using the reputation-based payments, leads the network to optimal performance, budget balance and individual rationality. In the second class of design problems, the designer utilizes her informational advantage over the agents and employ informational incentive mechanisms to disclose selectively information to the agents so as to influence the agents' decisions. In this class of problems, we address the challenge of designing an optimal informational incentive mechanism to enhance the security of dynamic networks. By using future information disclosure as a basis for promises and threats, we design an optimal incentive information mechanism that maximizes network security
  9. Keywords:
  10. Game Theory ; Management ; Network Management ; Competitive Agents ; Incentive Mechanisms Design

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