Management and Efficient Allocation of Resources in Competitive Networks, Ph.D. Dissertation Sharif University of Technology ; Golestani, Jamaloddin (Supervisor)
Abstract
In contrast to traditional Networks where a designer can specify an action plan for each agent, in a network with strategic agents, every agent acts selfishly and chooses his strategy privately so as to maximize his own objective. In this dissertation, we study problems arising in the design of static and dynamic networks with strategic agents. We consider two classes of design problems. In the first class, the designer utilizes her control over decisions and resources in the system to incentivize the agents via monetary incentive mechanisms to reveal their private information that is crucial for the efficient operation of the system. In this class of problems, we address two main challenges...
Cataloging briefManagement and Efficient Allocation of Resources in Competitive Networks, Ph.D. Dissertation Sharif University of Technology ; Golestani, Jamaloddin (Supervisor)
Abstract
In contrast to traditional Networks where a designer can specify an action plan for each agent, in a network with strategic agents, every agent acts selfishly and chooses his strategy privately so as to maximize his own objective. In this dissertation, we study problems arising in the design of static and dynamic networks with strategic agents. We consider two classes of design problems. In the first class, the designer utilizes her control over decisions and resources in the system to incentivize the agents via monetary incentive mechanisms to reveal their private information that is crucial for the efficient operation of the system. In this class of problems, we address two main challenges...
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