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Retail market equilibrium in multicarrier energy systems: A game theoretical approach

Khazeni, S ; Sharif University of Technology | 2018

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  1. Type of Document: Article
  2. DOI: 10.1109/JSYST.2018.2812807
  3. Publisher: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc , 2018
  4. Abstract:
  5. Multicarrier energy systems have provided the opportunity for users who are experiencing only must-run loads to participate in demand response programs by using self-generation units. In this paper, a bilevel game between so-called energy retailers and consumers with firm loads (as subsystems) is formulated in a multicarrier energy system. In the first level of this game, energy retailers offer selling prices for different energy carriers to maximize their profit. Consequently, consumers react to the offered prices by managing their purchasing power from the retail market to minimize their energy bill in the second level. The proposed approach leads to a mixed integer nonlinear programming problem which is sophisticated to solve. To simplify this complex problem, a solution method based on discretization technique is introduced to approach to an epsilon Nash point. The better performance of the proposed energy system model is shown in comparison with the base case and its effectiveness is validated experimentally over a practical benchmark system. The simulation results show a noticeable reduction in the energy production cost and users’ energy bill. Moreover, energy retailers gain more profit in the proposed approach. IEEE
  6. Keywords:
  7. Bilevel game ; Boilers ; Game theory ; Meters ; Multicarrier energy system ; Retail market ; Smart energy hub (S. E. hub) ; Benchmarking ; Commerce ; Costs ; Electric utilities ; Energy management ; Game theory ; Instruments ; Integer programming ; Natural gas ; Nonlinear programming ; Optimization ; Profitability ; Bilevel games ; Cogeneration ; Energy systems ; Games ; Retail market ; Smart energies ; Sales
  8. Source: IEEE Systems Journal ; 2018 ; 19328184 (ISSN)
  9. URL: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8331278