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Cost allocation under competition: a new rail access charging policy
Savelsbergh, M ; Sharif University of Technology | 2019
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- Type of Document: Article
- DOI: 10.1007/s13676-018-0133-z
- Publisher: Springer , 2019
- Abstract:
- We consider a setting in which a rail infrastructure provider divides the track costs proportionally between the above-rail operators based on their usage. We study a proposed access charge regime aimed at incentivizing the operators to use longer train configurations. The regime sets a target length and gives a discount on an operator’s charge if it deploys a configuration of at least the target. That is, the operators may be able to reduce their access charges by deploying a longer train configuration. We analyze the policy, and conditions under which both operators have an incentive to deploy long train configurations. © 2018, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature and EURO - The Association of European Operational Research Societies
- Keywords:
- Freight transport ; Infrastructure pricing ; Train path ; Freight transportation ; Game theory ; Railroad transportation ; Cost allocation ; Non-cooperative game theory ; Rail infrastructure ; Rail operators ; Train configuration ; Transport policy ; Costs
- Source: EURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics ; Volume 8, Issue 5 , 2019 , Pages 511-534 ; 21924376 (ISSN)
- URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13676-018-0133-z