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Know-how-first anti-intellectualism: Williamson against Williamson

Hosein, M ; Sharif University of Technology | 2022

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  1. Type of Document: Article
  2. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03823-7
  3. Publisher: Springer Science and Business Media B.V , 2022
  4. Abstract:
  5. Inspired by Williamson’s knowledge-first epistemology, I propose a position on practical knowledge that can be called the ‘know-how-first view’; yet whereas Williamson is one of the pioneers of the new intellectualism about know-how, I employ the know-how-first view to argue against intellectualism and instead develop a know-how-first version of anti-intellectualism. Williamson argues that propositional knowledge is a sui generis unanalyzable mental state that comes first in the epistemic realm; in parallel, I propose that know-how is a sui generis unanalyzable power that comes first in the practical realm. To motivate this suggestion, I put forward two arguments: (1) drawing on dispositionalist ideas, I argue that the practical component of know-how is unanalyzable; (2) based on an investigation of the natures of intentionality and intelligence, I argue that know-how is prior to intentional and intelligent abilities in the order of explanation of agential action. Deploying this know-how-first anti-intellectualism, I then set out know-how-first solutions to two challenging problems for anti-intellectualism: the sufficiency problem and the necessary condition problem. © 2022, The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V
  6. Keywords:
  7. Anti-intellectualism ; Disposition ; Intelligent ability ; Intentional ability ; Know-how-first ; Knowledge-first
  8. Source: Synthese ; Volume 200, Issue 4 , 2022 ; 00397857 (ISSN)
  9. URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11229-022-03823-7