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Economic performance of resource rich countries is related to their political systems. In this research, consistent to Hosseini (1388), we develop a theoretical model in which we classify the political systems of those countries to four systems based on corruption, myopic behavior of the incumbent, ideological bias of people, and the popularity shocks in elections. We show that in a fixed institutional framework, democracy leads to higher welfare for people and better economic performance. However, in a society with low corruption, high political convergence, and low popularity shocks both democracy and dictatorship maximize the social welfare in the model  

Cultural and social problems in the modern age have motivated many thinkers to analyze modernity. Some of them have tried to solve these problems and, if possible, prevent their occurrence in the future. Proposed solutions are mostly dystopian, i.e. by being disappointed, they think the only possible way to overcome these problems is to annihilate modern civilization, or they pursue a passive approach; i.e. they have accepted the problems of modernity but only seek a way to mitigate its challenges. Among these, solutions which try to make use of the capacities of the modern civilization, especially emerging technologies, are really scarce. These approaches seek to realize (and make... 

This paper develops a theoretical model based on economic misconceptions to explain the stylized facts of unsatisfactory long-term economic growth rates. Should the economic agents lack sufficient public understanding of economics, office-seeking politicians can take advantage of the situation and adopt populistic policies to get elected into office. Undermined economic growth is the price society pays for its ignorance. This mechanism is most relevant in democratic resource-abundant countries suffering from weak institutions. That is because natural resource price fluctuations make it more challenging to distinguish politicians’ performance and exogenous economic shocks, translating... 

The formation of development-supporting economic institutions, particularly through the lens of political institutions, remains a central question in political economy. This study distinguishes two key components of political institutions—power distribution and power transition—and empirically demonstrates that power distribution has a significant positive effect on economic institutional quality, while power transition becomes statistically insignificant once power distribution is controlled for. Based on whether political power is centralized or decentralized and whether its transfer is democratic or non-democratic, we define four political regimes: decentralized democracy, centralized...