Dispositional Essentialism and its Contradiction with Humean Metaphysics

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Ghafari, Shahryar | 2010

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 42058 (42)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Advisor(s): Karbasizade, Amir Ehsan
Abstract:
In recent decades one neo-Aristotelian school in metaphysics has appeared that with reconstruction on concept of "potency" or "power" try to explain metaphysical problems as: properties ,causation, laws of nature ,modalities and … .this school contradict all classical views in analytic metaphysics ,because they have commitment to Humean metaphysics that all metaphysical categories supervene on distinct particular facts in nature. Dispositional essentialism is one neo-Aristotelian theory saying that some natural properties have dispositional essence. In strong view of this theory, identity of properties supervenes on the structure of a network of properties and therefore properties are nothing but this structural network. In contrast, humean metaphysics say properties have a primary essence or quiddities. In "laws" problem there are two classical views that say laws are metaphysically contingent. Dispositional essentialism say laws of nature supervene on dispositional essences of properties ,so they are metaphysically necessary and in addition ,thanks to kripke , this necessity is epistemologically posteriori. Here arise challenges for theory that addressed in this thesis.
Keywords:
Nature Law ; Dispositional Essentialism ; Disposition, Power ; Properties Metaphysics ; Humean Metaphysics

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