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Incentive Compatible Trust Management Mechanism in Distributed Systems

Kolahdooz, Yalda | 2011

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: English
  3. Document No: 42254 (52)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology, International Campus, Kish Island
  5. Department: Science and Engineering
  6. Advisor(s): Safari, Mohammad Ali
  7. Abstract:
  8. Traditional security approaches prevented participants of an environment from malicious behavior by closely monitoring every transaction of the network. Such approaches are very costly in modern autonomous systems, besides, they are also impossible to apply in many cases. Trust management mechanisms are developed in order to ensure safe interactions with unknown parties in such open environments. Most trust management mechanisms rely on testimonies of interaction participants as the source of information to estimate a peer’s reputation. The first challenge that arises here is the lack of incentives for providing such information. Even if interaction parties are encouraged to report the interaction result, there is no guarantee to make sure the report is truthful. Finally, an individual may join a colluding group where the members decide on their strategy to maximize their gain. The chosen strategy may not be truthful. In this thesis, we propose a trust management mechanism using inspection games, to make truthful feedback provision the best strategy of a consumer. The mechanism also encourages proper behavior of service providers and obtains the probability of their misbehavior. Collusion among peers will not increase their gain. Collusion between a peer and an inspector may in some cases result in a higher gain. We have found the probabilities and the conditions on which a provider and an inspector may collude
  9. Keywords:
  10. Trust ; Game Theory ; Reputation ; Social Networks ; Incentive Compatible Management

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