Incentive Mechanisms For Peer-to-Peer Systems Based On Game Theory

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Iranmanesh, Mohadese | 2011

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: English
Document No: 42373 (52)
University: Sharif University of Technology, International Campus, Kish Island
Department: Science and Engineering
Advisor(s): Safari, Mohammad Ali
Abstract:
Since robustness of peer-to-peer networks depends heavily on voluntary resource sharing among individual peers, the intrinsic problem of free riding exists among autonomous rational peers that consume resources of others without contributing anything in return. One solution to the free riding problem in peer to peer networks is to have incentive mechanisms that aim to improve network efficiency by encouraging peers to cooperate. In this project, we have proposed a hybrid double-auction-based incentive mechanism for centralized peer-to-peer file sharing systems. In addition, a cryptography-based trust management scheme has been proposed to prevent peers from sending fake data. We have theoretically proved that the proposed incentive mechanism is incentive compatible and prevents peers from manipulation. Besides, we have proved the existence of an equilibrium point for each peer in which uploading is the dominant strategy. Simulation results confirm the robustness of the proposed mechanism in dealing with free-riding behavior and its efficiency in controlling the average download time and file availability of the system
Keywords:
Cryptography ; Incentive System ; Game Theory ; Peer-to-Peer File Sharing ; Double Auction ; Trust Management

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