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Application of Game Theory in the Design and Analysis Electronic Voting Protocols

Asgariyan, Nesa | 2011

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 44099 (05)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Electrical Engineering
  6. Advisor(s): Salmasizadeh, Mahmoud
  7. Abstract:
  8. A voting protocol was introduced by Popveniuc in 2006; it is receipt freeness, so appeared to be resistant against the bribed voter. In 2009 Clark using the bribed contract, and attacked to the voting protocol, in the elections by two candidates. He showed that this protocol is not resistant to the bribed voter. In this thesis, we use game theory and graph to extend the bribed contract for n candidates. Thus with the help of a graph, we show that this protocol with any number of candidates, is not resistant to the bribed voter, and we show that by increasing the number of candidates, the resistance of the protocol would be high and if the number of candidates is n, the success rate of this attack will be (2n-1)/n^2 . In addition, we show that two levels of bribe could be an optimum bribed contract, making it the most successful in the attack to the voting protocol.
    In addition to the listed topics, in this thesis, we suggest a voting protocol with the help mechanisms design in game theory. Robustness to bribery is one of the properties of the voting protocol, besides the characteristics of coercion resistance, undeniable voter, receipt freeness, verifiability, eligibility and anonymity. We compare our proposed protocol with other voting protocols
  9. Keywords:
  10. Cryptographic Protocols ; Electronic Voting ; Game Theory ; Incentive Compatible Management ; Bribed Voters

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