Analysis of Security Properties of E-voting Protocols: A Provable-security Approach

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Toroghi Haghighat, Ali Reza | 2013

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 44725 (19)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Computer Engineering
Advisor(s): Jalili, Rasool
Abstract:
Recent violation of security properties of e-voting protocols not using provable security, indicates the importance of provable security. In this thesis, we use the provable security approach to analyze security properties of e-voting protocols.In addition to presenting an efficient and provably secure protocol, the minimal assumptions to achieve privacyin e-voting protocols are analyzed. The firstcon-tribution of this thesis is presenting an efficient and provably secure coercion-resistant protocol, which is a variant of the JCJ e-voting protocol (Juels et al.,2010). It decreases the total number of JCJ’s operations fromO(n2) to O(n). The second contribution of this thesis is proving the minimal assumptions to achieve privacy in e-voting protocols. This thesis demonstrates that preserving privacy in e-voting protocols requires the provision of at least one of the fol-lowing assumptions: limited computational power of adversary, existence of an untappable/anonymous channel between voters and authorities, or physical as-sumptions
Keywords:
Electronic Voting ; Privacy ; Provable Security ; Coercion Resistance