Mind-Body Problem From Swinburne’s Point of View

Please enable javascript in your browser.

Azizi, Ali | 2015

471 Viewed

Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 47229 (42)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Philosophy of Science
Advisor(s): Azadegan, Ebrahim
Abstract:
In his Mind, Brain and Free Will, Swinburne introduces a new argument for substance dualism based on the synchronic unity of humans’ conscious experiences. He argues that the human body cannot be the substance of such a synchronic unity, and that this coexperiencing property, which is a mental property, is the essential property of the human substance: hence our substance is a mental substance. After providing a careful explanation of Swinburne’s subtle argument, I first try to demonstrate that it is metaphysically possible that the brain itself could instantiate such a synchronic unity without the need to presume another substance. Then I shall argue that it is unclear how to infer the essentiality of that mental property for our substance via the premises of the argument, unless we already presuppose substance dualism
Keywords:
Mind-Body Problem ; Emergent Properties ; Swinburne Theory ; Substance Dualism ; Property Dualism

No TOC