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An efficient and provably-secure coercion-resistant e-voting protocol

Haghighat, A. T ; Sharif University of Technology | 2013

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  1. Type of Document: Article
  2. DOI: 10.1109/PST.2013.6596050
  3. Publisher: 2013
  4. Abstract:
  5. We present an efficient and provably-secure e-voting protocol, which is a variant of the JCJ e-votingprotocol (Juels et al., 2010). It decreases the total number of JCJ's operations from O(n2) to O(n), where n is the number of votes or voters (whichever is the maximum). Note that since the operations under consideration are time-consuming (e.g., public-key encryption), the improvement is quite substantial. As a rough comparison, consider a nation-wide election with around ten million voters/votes. Assuming each operation takes one microsecond, and no parallelization is used, one can see a huge difference: our protocol tallies the votes in 10 seconds, while the JCJ protocol requires over 3 years to tally the votes. In order to achieve this level of efficiency, we change the ballot format and the tallying phase of the JCJ protocol. Moreover, we provide a complexity analysis and a detailed proof for coercion-resistance of our protocol
  6. Keywords:
  7. E-Voting Protocol ; Coercion-resistance ; Complexity analysis ; E-voting protocols ; Parallelizations ; Provable security ; Public-key encryption ; Public key cryptography
  8. Source: 2013 11th Annual Conference on Privacy, Security and Trust, PST 2013 ; 2013 , Pages 161-168 ; 9781467358392 (ISBN)
  9. URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6596050