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Minimal assumptions to achieve privacy in e-voting protocols

Haghighat, A. T ; Sharif University of Technology | 2013

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  1. Type of Document: Article
  2. DOI: 10.1109/ISCISC.2013.6767345
  3. Publisher: IEEE Computer Society , 2013
  4. Abstract:
  5. Chevallier-Mames et al, proved that in a specific condition (such as the lack of untappable channels and trusted-third parties), the universal verifiability and privacy-preserving properties of e-voting protocols are incompatible (WOTE'06 and TTE'10). In this paper, we first show a flaw in their proof. Then, we prove that even with more assumptions, such as the existence of TTPs and untappable channels between the authorities, an e-voting protocol is unable to preserve privacy, regardless of verifiability. Finally, we demonstrate that preserving privacy in e-voting protocols requires the provision of at least one of the following assumptions: limited computational power of adversary, existence of an untappable/anonymous channel between voters and the authorities, or physical assumptions
  6. Keywords:
  7. E-voting protocols ; Security of data ; Computational power ; Physical assumptions ; Privacy preserving ; Universal verifiability ; Verifiability ; Cryptography
  8. Source: 2013 10th International ISC Conference on Information Security and Cryptology, ISCISC 2013 ; 29- 30 August , 2013
  9. URL: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/articleDetails.jsp?arnumber=6767345