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A Power Analysis Countermeasure for a Lightweight Symetric Block Cipher

Safaei Pour, Morteza | 2015

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 48077 (05)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Electrical Engineering
  6. Advisor(s): Salmasizadeh, Mahmoud; Moradi, Amir
  7. Abstract:
  8. Among cryptography devices, resource constrained devices like sensors, RFID tags, smart cards and etc need a special class of cryptography algorithms. These devices have three limitations: memory, consumed power and computing power. Therefore, need a special class of cryptography algorithms that is lightweight cryptography. Lightweight cryptography systems have features and limitations that make them more vulnerable against attacks such as power analysis attacks. For this reason strengthening them against these attacks need more attention. So far, various countermeasure for secure implementation of different cryptography systems proposed. Most of them trying to decrease the correlation between intermediate values and consumed power with randomizing these intermediate values. Another class decrease this correlation with making consumed power more constant. Our proposed method try to make power consumption constant with considering power models. Every cryptography algorithm could be completely implemented with only two operands AND, XOR. This method maps computation to a new domain and uses equivalent AND, XOR. Therefore, hamming weight and hamming distance take constant values at each moment of time. This could decrease data-dependency between computed values and consumed power. When computation finished, output decoded and ciphertext obtained. In this thesis, we prepare hardware and software requirements for capturing many power traces and implementing power analysis attacks on unprotected and protected implementations of lightweight block cipher SIMON on a smart card as a case study to evaluate our proposed methods. We defining resistance as a number of traces that for less than that number we couldn’t find any moment in time that correlation coefficient of the correct key be more than correlation coefficient of other hypothetical keys. With use of proposed coding and four methods for AND-equivalent operand, we could achieve 350 more resistant against CPA attacks
  9. Keywords:
  10. Upgrading ; Power Analysis ; Simon's Algorithm ; Correlation Attack ; Hiding in Software

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