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A Game Theoretic Approach for Bidding Strategy in Wholesale Electricity Market in Iran

Noghani Behambari, Hamid | 2016

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 48531 (44)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Management and Economics
  6. Advisor(s): Fatemi Ardestati, Farshad
  7. Abstract:
  8. In this thesis، we consider bidding behavior of producers in wholesale electricity market in Iran. Participating in a day ahead pay-as-bid electricity auctions for Generator Companies with purpose of profit maximization in spite of market regulation constraints is taken into account. Since bidding functions are restricted to be evolved as a stepwise one with maximum of ten steps per unit in each hour، the main issue arise that whether increasing steps will improve the value of our objective function or not. Finally، in order to evaluate rationalities in bidding behavior of themarket participants، our results are compared with real bidding data combined for each power plant in a particular day.Ourmainmodel is the equilibriuminduced by supply function، which can be construed as a non-cooperative Bayesian Nash game. Each unit of generators in a power plant for each period auction take place، confronts a residual demand، which can be interpreted as a state of the game with a weight or a probability. By accruing data of all residual demand facing a specific generator during a period، we could draw out a possible supply function، imposing some step constraints and figuring proportion ate profit after clearing market. We conclude that by increasing steps in bidding functions، producers will experience higher profits in some cases mostly for off-pick times and for powerplants with high capacities
  9. Keywords:
  10. Bidding Strategy ; Game Theory ; Supply Function Model ; Day-ahead Electricity Market

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