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Propositional attitudes as commitments: unleashing some constraints

Kazemi, A ; Sharif University of Technology | 2020

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  1. Type of Document: Article
  2. DOI: 10.1017/S0012217320000098
  3. Publisher: Cambridge University Press , 2020
  4. Abstract:
  5. In a series of articles, Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements. Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2020
  6. Keywords:
  7. A priori normative supervenience ; Commitments ; Essential normativity of the mental ; Propositional attitudes ; Robert Brandom ; The Because Constraint
  8. Source: Dialogue-Canadian Philosophical Review ; Volume 59, Issue 3 , 2020 , Pages 437-457
  9. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/dialogue-canadian-philosophical-review-revue-canadienne-de-philosophie/article/abs/propositional-attitudes-as-commitments-unleashing-some-constraints/C1D70E750EE48EE2A655EDA2B358BEAC