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Recognition and the Nature of Self-consciousness in Fichte and Hegel

Shokrollahnia Roshan, Majid | 2021

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 53976 (42)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Philosophy of Science and Technology
  6. Advisor(s): Abazari, Arash
  7. Abstract:
  8. For both Fichte and Hegel, self-consciousness is an intersubjective concept; that is, for them, self-consciousness is necessarily constituted between, at least, two subjects. In Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte introduces summons and recognition as necessary conditions of self-consciousness, without which, i.e. an other who is calling upon the subject, the subject cannot be conscious at all. Hegel, in Phenomenology of Spirit, also says self-consciousness is desire which is satisfied only in another (self-) consciousness. Based on these ideas, I try to show that self-consciousness can be defined as having the both in view; the self (I) and the other (not-I), at the same time. In this sense, and despite its being widely accepted as an intersubjective concept, I take self-consciousness to be originally first-person. That is, it is the subject himself, who as a self-conscious being, should along with himself have the other in view. To me, this (having the both in view) is why self-consciousness seems to be a contradictory and irreconcilable situation in which the subject experiences an internal tension. To show this contradiction and the inherent tension in self-consciousness, I start from Rousseau’s idea of general will in Social Contract and then highlight an embedded understanding of self-consciousness which is important to Fichte and Hegel; how to have the other(s) in view, i.e. being constrained to him (them), and remain free as well?
  9. Keywords:
  10. General Will ; Rousseau ; Self-Consciousness ; Desire ; Fichte ; Hegel ; Summons

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