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An Evaluation of the Recent Assessments of the Pessimistic Induction

Shafiee, Mohammad | 2022

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 55181 (42)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technolog
  5. Department: Philosophy of Science
  6. Advisor(s): Akbari Takhtameshlou, Javad
  7. Abstract:
  8. Past theory-changes in science were sometimes accompanied by radical conceptual shifts. This has urged some philosophers of science to project the same possibility onto current theories and suspend belief in the conceptual parts of our current best scientific theories. This type of argument is called the “pessimistic induction” (PI) and is often used by scientific anti-realists. Scientific realists, on the other hand, have argued against PI, by insisting that past theory-changes were not as radical as anti-realists suggest, as well as by appealing to the differences between current and past science. In recent decades, anti-realists, such as Kyle Stanford and Brad Wray, have renewed the threat of PI, and realists have also deployed new arguments against it. My goal in this research is to take a look at these latest studies on the pessimistic induction. My contribution will be to propose a new formulation of Stanford's and Wray's arguments, one that might be called the “explanatory pessimistic induction” (EPI). EPI first explains the factors that have led to radical theory-changes in the past, and then argues that the same factors still exist in current science. EPI may provide stronger grounds for anti-realism about current best scientific theories than mere enumerative induction
  9. Keywords:
  10. Scientific Realism ; Antirealism ; Pessimistic Induction ; Theory-Change ; Kyle Stanford Theorem ; Brad Wray Theorem ; Larry Laudan Theorem

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