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Towards a New Account of Science and Values

Motesharei, Amir | 2023

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 56495 (42)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Philosophy of Science
  6. Advisor(s): Taqavi, Mostafa
  7. Abstract:
  8. The long-lasting debate on the value-free ideal of science has cooled down in the past two decades. Many philosophers of science now believe that scientific activity, even in the theory-evaluation phase, cannot be done completely free of social and ethical values. Thus in recent years, science and values literature has been more specific and mostly focused on the role of values in different phases of scientific activity. One of the well-noted topics is the epistemic priority thesis, in which its proponents prioritize epistemic considerations in the evaluation of scientific theories, to preserve the objectivity of science. In contrast, several criticisms have been directed at this thesis. We believe that current accounts cannot respond to these criticisms properly, and we need to formulate a new account with a systematic framework of the role of values in science. In this dissertation, we will try to formulate such an account by using the approach of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism and replacing truth with empirical adequacy. In our account, the theory-choice step is divided into two phases with a dialectic relation: the epistemic acceptance phase and the pragmatic choice phase, respectively containing epistemic and non-epistemic considerations. This division lets us not only preserve the epistemic priority thesis but also specify the exact position and function of non-epistemic values in a systematic framework and respond to the criticisms against the epistemic priority thesis. In the first chapter, we shortly describe the science and values literature from the beginning to the contemporary debates. In the second chapter, we explain the contemporary approaches to the epistemic priority thesis and the criticisms against it. The third chapter is dedicated to a short narrative of van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism. In the fourth chapter, we formulate our account and then answer the criticisms in the fifth chapter
  9. Keywords:
  10. Science and Value Relation ; Non-Epistemic Values ; Epistemic Values ; Constructive Empiricism ; Pragmatic Criticism ; Epistemic Priority

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