Embodied Cognition and The Concept of Emotion

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Zamani, Parsa | 2025

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 57885 (42)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Philosophy of Science
Advisor(s): Azadegan, Ebrahim
Abstract:
Emotions and their various cognitive and bodily facets have always posed a challenge to theorists. This challenge is encapsulated in the question of how one can, within a coherent theory, provide an explanation that accounts for both the cognitive dimensions—stemming from normativity—and the bodily aspect. Cognitivism regards emotions solely as judgments and evaluations of oneself and the environment, thereby neglecting their bodily dimension. Similarly, feeling theories of emotion, such as William James’s theory, also eliminate the cognitive dimension, rendering them somewhat reductionist. Within the framework of the new research program of embodied cognition, arguments have been advanced to justify a comprehensive theory. In this thesis, I attempt, firstly, to address the aforementioned challenge by examining both the various cognitive dimensions and the embodied cognition approach, and secondly, to review some variants of embodied emotion theories. I argue that although these theories, by introducing a new concept of intentionality, endeavor to address this challenge, they ultimately fail to resolve the issue of normativity and the appropriateness or inappropriateness of emotions
Keywords:
Normativity ; Embodied Cognition ; Enactivism ; Embodied Emotions

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