Sharif Digital Repository

Filtered mode shapes are used to detect the presence, location, size and shape of the delaminations in composite laminated plates with various boundary conditions. This method is the extension of a previous study by the authors on the delamination detection in the beams using irregularities of the mode shapes. The mode shapes are filtered to separate the smooth and irregular parts. Presence and situation of delamination affects these separated parts, and these effects are used to detect the delamination. Here, two new indicators, named 'slope of smooth part' and 'irregularities in the slope of smooth part', are introduced to increase the clarity of detected damage and reduce the noisy... 

In order to maintain the production of offshore oil wells, the National Iranian Oil Company periodically services facilities and equipment located in oil wellheads with mobile wellhead servants. It also gives technical supports to oil wellheads and mobile wellhead servants with supporter vessels. Due to supply limitations, there are not enough special vessels (namely supporter vessels and mobile wellhead servants) compared to the number of oil wellheads. The failure of special vessels to service oil wellheads and supporter vessels to technically support mobile wellhead servants based on a predetermined plan, will lead to considerable loss in production performance of oil wells and hence... 

In this paper, a new algorithm for solving the shortest loop design problem is presented. The shortest loop design problem is to find the shortest loop for an automated guided vehicle covering at least one edge of each department of a block layout. In this paper, first it is shown that this problem can be represented as a graph model. The properties of the presented model enable us to design a meta-heuristic based on ant colony system algorithm for solving the shortest loop design problem. Computational results show the efficiency of our algorithm in compare to the other techniques  

In a series of articles, Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude (PA) ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements. Copyright © Canadian Philosophical Association 2020  

A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no-guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as... 

A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no-guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as... 

Abraham’s Dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s commands are never morally wrong, (ii) God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and (iii) killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition (ii) in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition (ii) tend to appeal to epistemic failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called accordion effect in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in... 

In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well explained by this explanatory framework? This article provides a novel response to this enduring objection. First, following Brandom, it is suggested that, to understand the normativity of intentional states, we should countenance and distinguish between two normative categories of commitment and entitlement, only the former of which is argued to be essential for intentional explanations. Conflating these two normative dimensions is noted to be one of the main sources of the objections leveled against... 

Abraham’s Dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: (i) God’s commands are never morally wrong, (ii) God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and (iii) killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition (ii) in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition (ii) tend to appeal to epistemic failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called accordion effect in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in... 

In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well explained by this explanatory framework? This article provides a novel response to this enduring objection. First, following Brandom, it is suggested that, to understand the normativity of intentional states, we should countenance and distinguish between two normative categories of commitment and entitlement, only the former of which is argued to be essential for intentional explanations. Conflating these two normative dimensions is noted to be one of the main sources of the objections leveled against...