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A dynamic incentive mechanism for security in networks of interdependent agents

Farhadi, F ; Sharif University of Technology | 2017

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  1. Type of Document: Article
  2. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_8
  3. Publisher: Springer Verlag , 2017
  4. Abstract:
  5. We study a dynamic mechanism design problem for a network of interdependent strategic agents with coupled dynamics. In contrast to the existing results for static settings, we present a dynamic mechanism that is incentive compatible, individually rational, budget balanced, and social welfare maximizing. We utilize the correlation among agents’ states over time, and determine a set of inference signals for all agents that enable us to design a set of incentive payments that internalize the effect of each agent on the overall network dynamic status, and thus, align each agent’s objective with the social objective. © 2017, ICST Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
  6. Keywords:
  7. Dynamic mechanism design ; Epidemics over networks ; Security games ; Budget control ; Game theory ; Machine design ; Coupled dynamics ; Dynamic mechanism ; Incentive compatible ; Incentive mechanism ; Incentive payments ; Overall networks ; Security games ; Social objectives ; Dynamics
  8. Source: 7th EAI International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, GameNets 2017, 9 May 2017 through 9 May 2017 ; Volume 212 , 2017 , Pages 86-96 ; 18678211 (ISSN); 9783319675398 (ISBN)
  9. URL: https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-67540-4_8