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Envy-free mechanisms with minimum number of cuts

Alijani, R ; Sharif University of Technology | 2017

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  1. Type of Document: Article
  2. Publisher: AAAI press , 2017
  3. Abstract:
  4. We study the problem of fair division of a heterogeneous resource among strategic players. Given a divisible heterogeneous cake, we wish to divide the cake among n players in a way that meets the following criteria: (I) every player (weakly) prefers his allocated cake to any other player's share (such notion is known as envy-freeness), (II) the mechanism is strategy-proof (truthful), and (III) the number of cuts made on the cake is minimal. We provide methods, namely expansion process and expansion process with unlocking, for dividing the cake under different assumptions on the valuation functions of the players. Copyright © 2017, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved
  5. Keywords:
  6. Envy free ; Expansion process ; Fair divisions ; Heterogeneous resources ; IS strategy ; Valuation function ; Artificial intelligence
  7. Source: 31st AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2017, 4 February 2017 through 10 February 2017 ; 2017 , Pages 312-318
  8. URL: https://aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI17/paper/view/14608