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Formal Analysis of Security Properties of Homomorphic-Cryptography-Based E-voting Protocols using µCRL

Haghighat, Mohammad Hashem | 2010

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 41136 (19)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Computer Engineering
  6. Advisor(s): Jalili, Rasool
  7. Abstract:
  8. With fast improvements of technology in advances in electronic voting systems, has been very effective in substantially reducing the disadvantages of traditional elections and thus enhancing the legitimacy of those being elective. These systems, to be effective,
    ought to be designed based on several security factors such as eligibility, correctness, voters' privacy, verifiability and receipt-freeness. One of the most important issues in this concept is ensuring the satisfaction of these properties. Using an incomplete and vulnerable system may cause negative consequences. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate the system before implementation. Using formal methods for verification of security properties is preferred due to inapplicability of informal and observational proofs. Our objective in this thesis is formal verifying two important properties (eligibility and election verifiability) in electronic voting systems. To this aim, we formalize a voting process which abstracts voting protocols behavior and captures all test required for checking each property. We also use mCRL2 language and its toolset to apply these frameworks on two well-known e-voting protocols, Lee&Kim and FOO92, as case studies
  9. Keywords:
  10. Electronic Voting ; Process Algebra ; Formal Verification ; Hommorphic Encryption ; mCRL2 Language ; Labeled Transition System ; Election Verifiability

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