A priority of Logic

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Bagheri, Mehdi | 2010

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 42015 (42)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Philosophy of Science
Advisor(s): Nasrin, Mehdi
Abstract:
Hartry Field argues that meaning-besed approaches to explaining the apriority of certain propositions fail to succeed in their endeavour. He suggests that adoting what one cals a non-factualist view of justification itself removes the mystery of the apriority of such propositions, and sketches what such a view of justification involves. A priori justification is often thought mysterious or out of keeping with a naturalistic view of the world; strong forms of priori justification that involve empirical indefeasibility are often thought especially mysterious. While this is no doubt correct for excessive claims of a priority – for instance, claims to prori acces to features of the physical world – Field will argue that it is incorrect if inteneded as claim about the existence of any apriority at all. What is mysterious in most forms of (non- excessive) apriorism isn’t the apriorism itself but the background assumptions about epistemology. But in questioning these background assumptions, Field will be producing an account of arpriority that few apriorists will like.
Keywords:
Justification ; Apriority ; Hartry Field ; Non-Factualism

No TOC