Scheme-Content Dualism

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Rayati, Maede | 2013

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 44207 (42)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Philosophy of Science
Advisor(s): Sheykh Rezaee, Hossein
Abstract:
According to Davidson the distinction between the conceptual scheme and the empirical content is the last dogma of empiricism, and its abandonment will amount to abandoning what has remained from empiricism. To him, conceptual schemes are ways of organizing experience or systems of categories that form the data of sensation or fact, contents being data of sensation or facts which are neutral and out of all schemes. While Quine seems committed to such a distinction, Davidson provides arguments to show that the distinction is untenable. This discrepancy between Quine and Davidson is what this dissertation elaborates on. More specifically, the dissertation pursues two main aims: to show in what sense Quine’s empiricism requires the distinction between scheme and content, and to show that instead of arguing for the plausibility or implausibility of scheme-content dualism, we have to discuss the plausibility or implausibility of the proximal or distal theories
Keywords:
Meaning Theory ; Quine Radical Translation ; Davidson Radical Interpretation ; Translatability ; Conceptual Scheme ; Empirical Content ; Empiricism ; Third Dogma

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