Between-Group Adverse Selection: Evidence from Irans’s Group Supplemental Health Insurance

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Chaghomi, Mohamadreza | 2017

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Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
Language: Farsi
Document No: 50385 (44)
University: Sharif University of Technology
Department: Management and Economics
Advisor(s): Vesal, Mohammad; Keshavarz Haddad, Gholamreza
Abstract:
In this article, asymmetric information is tested via a positive correlation test in the group supplemental health insurance (GSHI). Furthermore, using dynamic features of insurance contracts, moral hazard is separated from learning. For these two tests, Asia Insurance Company longitudinal data, for two types of paraclinical and hospital health services, during the period 2011-2016, is used. We find that the effect of asymmetric information is not significant in hospital services, as there is not any moral hazard in this group, we can conclude that there is also no between-group adverse selection in GSHI. On the other hand, in the group of paraclinical services, there is asymmetric information Which is mainly due to the presence of moral hazard. Finally, the results show that learning over time is mainly occurred by the insured groups
Keywords:
Asymmetric Information ; Moral Hazard ; Learning ; Private Health Insurance ; Between Group Adverse Select ; Group Supplemental Health Insurance

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