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The Problem of Error Theory about Normative Properties and Its Consequences

Etemadi-Someoliayi, Khashayar | 2019

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 52114 (42)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Philosophy of Science
  6. Advisor(s): Azadegan, Ebrahim
  7. Abstract:
  8. This MA dissertaion is dedicated to the discussion of the error theory about all normative judgements and its consequences. This theory contains two main claims: 1- normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, and 2- no normative property exists. In this dissertation, in particular, Bart Streumer’s arguments against the competitors of this theory are discussed and criticized. Streumer argues against non-reductivism, reductivism, and non-cognitivism in three separate arguments. In another argument, he tries to show that the error theory about all normative judgements is unbelievable. In addition to discussing Streumer’s arguments, I also propose new formulations of some of these arguments in order to undermine some of the objections. Moreover, I argue that, based on his own claims, we can propose a counterexample against his argument against non-reductivism. I also show that if Streumer makes some minor changes in his claims in order to avoid this objection, this move will undermine his argument against reductivism. In the discussion of Streumer’s argument for unbelievability of error theory, I show that although he is successful in responding to most of the objections, one of the objections remains unanswered.Finally, I briefly consider some of the consequences of the error theory about all normative properties in epistemology, ethics, and philosophy of action. I show that this theory has some unpopular consequences, especially, in epistemology and philosophy of action
  9. Keywords:
  10. Reductionism ; Non-Reductivism ; Non-Cognitivism ; Unbelievability ; Normative Judgements

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