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A Critique on the Concept of Reliability of Science in Douglas's Philosophy of Science

Rahimi, Ali | 2020

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  1. Type of Document: M.Sc. Thesis
  2. Language: Farsi
  3. Document No: 53516 (42)
  4. University: Sharif University of Technology
  5. Department: Philosophy of Science
  6. Advisor(s): Taqavi, Mostafa
  7. Abstract:
  8. Does the direct involvement of social values in science, damage the reliability of scientific claims? Using recent debates in the relation between science and value, I will try to answer this question. Over the past few years, it has been shown that values can play a role in justifying scientific knowledge. People like Jeffrey and Betz try to take values out of science using methodological advice; while others, like Douglas, argue that values cannot and should not be excluded from science. If we accept the presence of values, there must be limits to their involvement, or we will fall to chaotic state. One of the concepts that can help us to regulate the behavior of values, is the reliability of the scientific claim. Thus, in some cases, values have no right to interfere, because the reliability of the claim is called into question. I believe that Douglas's method of regulating interfere of values have great importance and application in the science and policy making of our time. But there is a flaw in her use of the concept of reliability, which could be destructive for his philosophy of science. Douglas has taken reliability for granted and does not explain it. In this way, one can have interpretations of reliability that place him/her completely on the side of value-free science; which is violation of purpose of using concept of reliability. In addition, there are some claims in the history of science that do not follow Douglas' standards, but are quite reliable. Douglas must define his meaning of reliability, or her efforts would be in vain
  9. Keywords:
  10. Scientific Method ; Social Responsibility ; Science Reliability ; Epistemic Values ; Non-Epistemic Values

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